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Abstract. Recently, blockchain technology, which adds records to a list using cryptographic links, has been widely applied in the 
financial field. Therefore, the security of blockchain smart contracts is among the most popular contemporary research topics. To 
improve the theorem-proving technology in this field, we are developing an extensible hybrid verification tool chain, denoted as 
FSPVM-E, for Ethereum smart contract verification. This hybrid system extends the Coq proof assistant, a formal 
proof-management system. Combining symbolic execution with higher-order theorem-proving, it solves consistency, automation, 
and reusability problems by standard theorem-proving approaches. This article completes the FSPVM-E by developing its proof 
engine. FSPVM-E is an extensible definitional interpreter based on our previous work FEther, which is totally developed in the 
Coq proof assistant. It supports almost all semantics of the Solidity programing language, and simultaneously executes multiple 
types of symbols. FEther also contains a set of automatic strategies that execute and verify the smart contracts in Coq with a high 
level of automation. The functional correctness of FEther was verified in Coq. The execution efficiency of FEther far exceeded 
that of the interpreters which are developed in Coq in accordance with the standard tutorial. To our knowledge, FEther is the first 
definitional interpreter of the Solidity language in Coq. 
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1. Introduction
1
 
Blockchain technology [1], which adds records to a list using cryptographic links, is among the most popular contemporary 
technologies. Ethereum is a widely adopted blockchain system that implements a general-purpose, Turing-complete programing 
language called Solidity [2]. Ethereum enables the development of arbitrary smart contracts that can automate blockchain 
transactions in a virtual runtime environment, namely, the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Here smart contracts refer to the 
applications and scripts (i.e., programs) that execute the blockchain. The growing use of smart contracts has necessitated increased 
scrutiny of their security. Smart contracts can include particular properties (i.e., bugs) that expose them to deliberate attacks 
causing direct economic loss. Some of the largest attacks on smart contracts are well known, such as the attacks on decentralized 
autonomous organizations [3] and parity wallet contracts [4]. Many classes of subtle bugs, ranging from transaction-ordering 
dependencies to mishandled exceptions, exist in smart contracts [5]. Therefore, the security and reliability of smart-contract 
programs must be verified as rigorously as possible. The properties of programs can be rigorously verified by proving 
higher-order logic theorems. In the standard approach, a formal model for the target software system is manually abstracted using 
higher-order theorem-proving assistants. Such formal verification technology provides sufficient freedom and flexibility for 
designing formal models based on higher-order logic theories, and can abstract and express very complex systems. However, 
when applied to program verification, the advantages of theorem-proving technology are suppressed by automation, reusability, 
consistency and efficiency problems. 
The above issues can be resolved by a formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) [6], which directly and 
symbolically executes real-world smart-contract programs using higher-order theorem-proving assistants. The program’s 
properties are then automatically verified by the execution result. To this end, we are developing an FSPVM named FSPVM-E [7] 
for smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum platform. FSPVM-E is programed in Coq (a formal proof-management system) and 
inspired by KLEE, a high-coverage test generator for complex-systems programs [8]. Similarly to [9], the symbolic execution of 
FSPVM-E is verified in FEther, a hybrid proof engine that supports multiple types of symbolic execution. FEther, however, is 
designed for higher-order theorem proving, and its verification process is founded on Hoare [10] and reachability [11] logic. 
Therefore, the successful implementation of an FSPVM must overcome several challenges [6]. 
 Some of these challenges have been addressed in our recent studies. In [6], we noted the lack of a versatile formal memory 
model for constructing the logic operating environment within a higher-order theorem-proving system. We thus developed a 
general, extensible, and reusable formal memory (GERM) framework based on higher-order logic using Coq [12]. In a later work, 
we extended the Curry-Howard isomorphism (CHI) [13] to resolve the basic theory of FSPVM. Herein denoted as 
execution-verification isomorphism (EVI), our solution combines theorem proving and symbolic execution technology. Finally, 
we developed an extensible large subset of the Solidity programing language, denoted as Lolisa [14], which equivalently 
formalizes real-world programing languages as an extensible intermediate programing language. 
 The present paper completes the FSPVM-E by overcoming the final challenge: developing its proof engine. Our 
contributions are as follows. First, we develop a definitional interpreter in Coq’s specification language (Gallina). This interpreter 
symbolically executes the smart contracts of Ethereum written in Lolisa on the GERM framework. The execution results are 
represented by a GERM logic memory state, which can be verified in Coq. Next, we implement a set of automatic evaluation 
strategies based on the Ltac [12] mechanism, by which FEther finishes the execution and verification process. The correctness of 
FEther is then certified in Coq. The present FEther is the optimized version with higher evaluation efficiency than the interpreters 
developed in Coq using standard tutorial approaches. To our knowledge, FEther is the first hybrid proof engine specification that 
automatically and symbolically executes and verifies Ethereum smart contracts in Coq. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the difference between the FEther and other relevant 
works. Section 3 introduces the foundations of the present work, including the prototype, the basic environment of Lolisa, and the 
preparatory modification of the GERM framework. Section 4 describes the theoretical design and implementation of FEther, and 
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formal memory; BMC, bounded model checking; CBNT, call-by-name termination; IRE, information redundancy explosion; CR, concurrent 
reduction; TCB, trusted computation base; TCOC, trusted core of Coq; ISA, instruction set architecture. 
its self-correctness certification. Section 5 verifies FEther in a real-world case study and analyzes its benefits. Section 6 discusses 
the advantages and limitations of FEther. The study concludes with Section 7. 
2. Related Works 
 The security of smart contracts has been seriously researched since 2015. The security of smart contracts and similar 
lightweight programs can be rigorously guaranteed by formal methods. Our symbolic executor has several novel features that 
distinguish it from other approaches. This section introduces the interesting achievements already reported in this field. 
 The EVM execution is formally described in Yellow Paper [15]. This official document also provides the data, algorithms, 
and parameters required for building consensus-compatible EVM clients and Ethereum implementations. Yellow Paper, however, 
does not always clarify the operational behavior of the EVM. In such cases, it is often easier to consult an executable 
implementation for guidance. 
 Most of the recent researches have concentrated on EVM security. The C++ implementation Cpp-ethereum plays a dual role 
of security and defector semantics in EVMs. Lem semantics [16] is a Lem [17] implementation of EVM providing executable 
semantics of EVM, which formally verifies smart contracts. However, the Lem semantics do not precisely capture the 
inter-contract execution. KEVM [18] is a formal semantics for EVMs, resembling Lem but written in the K-framework. As 
KEVM is executable, it can run the validation test suite provided by the Ethereum foundation. According to the authors of [18], 
the KEVM reference interpreter passes the full 40,683-test EVM compliance suite. Nevertheless, self-correctness cannot be 
proven completely or even certified in KEVM. Moreover, none of the above approaches satisfies the de Bruijn criterion [19].  
 Mythril [20] is a security analysis tool for Ethereum smart contracts. Mythril detects various problems by concolic analysis, 
but whether the tool effectively increases the reliability of smart contracts has not been proven. 
 The above researches adopt the bytecode of Solidity. The consistency between Solidity and bytecode after compiling cannot 
be guaranteed. However, high-level formal specifications and relevant formal verification tools of Solidity, which are important 
for programing and debugging smart contract software, have received little attention.  
 Finally, some of these works focus on a specific domain. Their complex architecture is inflexible and not easily extendible to 
new relevant problems. 
3 Foundational Concepts 
 The present paper builds upon our recent previous works. Therefore, prior to defining the formal specifications of FEther, we 
first define the basic environment. 
3.1 Predefinitions 
 Previously, we constructed a prototype of our FSPVM framework, which extends the proof assistants as a hybrid system 
combining symbolic execution and higher-order theorem proving. This prototype solves consistency, automation, and reusability 
problems in standard theorem-proving approaches. The prototype, which is the blueprint of FSPVM-E, consists of the following 
two parts. 
 The first step combines symbolic execution and higher-order theorem-proving, and simulates the execution of real-world 
programs. The prototype is verified by solving the consistency, automation, and reusability problems of higher-order 
theorem-proving. The blueprint (denoted as FSPVM) extends the higher-order theorem-proving assistants that support CHI. 
Specifically, we extend CHI to EVI, which operates under Principles 1 and 2 below: 
                                      verifications correspond to proofs                                    (1). 
                                  verifications correspond to execution of programs                           (2). 
 FSPVM also contains a formal general memory model ℱℳ and a formal intermediate language ℱℒ (equivalent to the 
respective general-purpose programing language ℒ), for rewriting the formal versions of RWprogram as FRWprogram. It also 
requires a formally verified interpreter (FInterpreter), which plays the roles of the execution-engine core in the FSPVM (i.e., 
simulating the real execution process of FRWprograms and generating the logic memory states; see Figure 1). The executable 
semantics of ℱℒ provide the instruction set architecture (ISA) of FInterpreter. Currently, we are developing a specified extensible 
verified FSPVM in Coq for Ethereum smart-contracts verification, denoted as FSPVM-E. In FSPVM-E, the ℱℳ and ℱℒ are 
the GERM framework and the Lolisa programing language, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Equivalence of real world program (RWprogram) execution and execution in a logic environment 
 
GERM The GERM is a general, extensible, and reusable formal memory framework. It simultaneously supports different formal 
verification specifications, particularly at the code level. This framework simulates the physical memory hardware structure, 
including a low-level formal memory space, and provides a set of simple, nonintrusive application programing interfaces (APIs). 
The proposed GERM framework is independent and customizable, and was verified entirely in Coq. Table 1 summarizes the 
top-level interface of FEther, where mvalue and a represent a memory value of type value and a memory address of type 
𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠, respectively. In the specific formal specification, a formal memory state has type memory. Finally, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟  represents the 
block information for environment checking. 
 
Lolisa The ℱℒ is Lolisa, a large subset of the Solidity programing language. Assisted by generalized algebraic datatypes 
(GADTs) [21], the formal syntax of Lolisa adopts a stronger static-type system than Solidity, which enhances the type safety. 
Lolisa includes contract declarations (Contract), modifier declarations (Modifier), variable declarations (Var), structure 
declarations (Struct), assignments (Assign), returns (Return), multi-value returns (Returns), throws (Throw), skips (Snil), function 
definitions (Fun), while loops (𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒), for loops (𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑟), function calls (𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙), and conditional (If) and sequence 
statements.  
 
Function Description 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑟  Read mvalue from 𝑎 directly 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 Read mvalue from 𝑎 after validation checking 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟  Write mvalue at 𝑎 directly 
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 Write mvalue at 𝑎 after validation checking 
𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡  Offset address 𝑎 to 𝑎′ 
𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 Allocate memory blocks 
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚 Free a specified memory block  
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚 Initialize the entire memory space 
Table 1. Basic memory-management APIs employed in the formal memory model. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the helper states used in the dynamic semantic definitions, and Table 3 lists the helper functions for 
calculating commonly needed values in the current program state. All of these state functions will be encountered in the following 
discussion. The components of specific states will be denoted by appropriate Greek letters subscripted by the state of interest. In 
Table 2, 𝑀, 𝜎, and ℰ denote the contexts of the formal memory space, a specific memory state, and the execution environment, 
respectively. The proof evaluation is executed in the proof contexts, denoted as 𝛤, 𝛤1, … For brevity, we hereafter represent the 
overall formal system by ℱ, the current execution environment by 𝑒𝑛𝑣, and the super-environment of type env by 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣. 
In the following sections, we introduce the relevant analysis and solutions that improve the computation efficiency of ℱℐ in 
higher-order theorem-proving assistants. 
 
      
ℱℒ
ℒ
FRWprogram
RWprogram
𝑒 𝑒𝑐 𝑡𝑒
𝑒 𝑒𝑐 𝑡𝑒
Interpreter + Memory
FInterpreter + FMemory
 𝑛  𝑡
 𝑛  𝑡
Formal 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
equivalently translate
FPLs FPLs
      
develop formalize
Logic operating environment
Physical operating environment
equivalent virtualize
 ℰ environment information ℱ formal system world 
𝛭 memory space 𝛤 proof context 
Table 2. State functions in the dynamic semantic definitions 
 
To simplify the verification process and the development of the respective formal verified Lolisa interpreter in Coq, we 
maintained the Lolisa programs as structural programs. For this purpose, the semantics of Lolisa were forced to adhere to the 
following pointer counter axiom. The conventions of the Struct datatypes are defined in Convention 1. The Pointer Counter axiom 
is a FEther design principle that maintains Lolisa as a structural language. 
Axiom (Pointer Counter): If statement s is the next execution statement, it must be the head of the statement sequence in the 
next iteration. 
 
𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑣 Changes the current environment 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 Validates the current environment 
𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ Searches the address of array elements 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟  Initializes variable into memory block 
𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎  Searches the address of mapping elements 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑟  Evaluates the struct datatype 
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑜  Evaluates binary expression of Lolisa value 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑜  Evaluates unary expression of Lolisa value 
 𝑒 𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑  Searches the valid struct field 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 Evaluates the struct value basic information 
Table 3. Helper functions 
 
 
Convention 1. Formal Struct datatypes 
 
 To avoid infinite loops in the programs, FSPVM also imports bounded model checking (BMC) [22]. Fortunately, the EVM 
does not support infinite execution processes, as each execution step costs the gas of the smart contract owners. If the gas balance 
cannot satisfy the limitation, the execution terminates. This design well suits the BMC concept. Therefore, our implementation 
uses gas to limit the execution of the Solidity programs. 
 In the following contents, we represent other arguments by the wildcard “ * ” and by the symbol {| ∗ ⟼ ∗ |} . 𝐸 is the syntax 
of constructor pattern matching of the 𝜆-expression 𝐸 [23]. To avoid ambiguity in the following discussion of FEther, the 
functions represent the programs and functions written in Gallina, and RWprogram represents the real-world programs written in 
general-purpose programing languages.  
3.2 Modifications for optimization 
 As mentioned previously, when analyzing the current problems, the computational efficiency of the definitional interpreter 
based on the FSPVM may be extremely low. The three essential problems are call-by-name termination (CBNT), information 
redundancy explosion (IRE), and concurrent reduction (CR). To optimize the low-level computations of the evaluation problems, 
we incorporate the respective solutions in [25] into the implementation details of FEther. 
 First, the sequence statement s is implicitly replaced by an equivalent list rather than explicitly defined, which avoids the 
CBNT problem. Second, the pattern matchings and reusable functions are encapsulated as optimization helper functions. Some of 
these functions are summarized in Table 4. To avoid the CR problem, we finally impose a limitation K (independent of the gas 
constraint) on the expression and value layers. 
 
 
 
 
Type level Declare type annotation   
Value level Represent struct value & field value 
Expression level Represent right value of struct type 
Statement level Declare new struct type 
𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑣 Changes the current environment 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 Validates the current environment 
𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ Searches the address of array elements 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟  Initializes variable into memory block 
𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎  Searches the address of mapping elements 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑟  Evaluates the struct datatype 
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑜  Evaluates binary expression of Lolisa values 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑜  Evaluates unary expression of Lolisa value 
 𝑒 𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑  Searches the valid struct fields 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 Evaluates the struct value basic information 
𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 Checks the validation of the l-position expressions 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙  Gets the Boolean value from memory value 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  Check the declaration of array type 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑡 Gets the statement value from memory value 
Table 4. Encapsulation functions in the optimized FEther 
4. FEther Implementation  
 FEther is the bridge that connects the GERM framework, the Lolisa programing language, and the trusted core of Coq 
(TCOC). As demonstrated in our previous work and elaborated in the following subsections, FEther can be totally built in Coq. 
4.1. Architecture 
 Figure 2 shows the overall structure of the FEther framework. The whole FEther is constructed in the trusted domain of Coq, 
and logically comprises three main components: a parser, an ISA based on Lolisa semantics, and a validation checking mechanism 
(see left, center and right blocks in Figure. 2, respectively). The parser analyzes the syntax of the FRWprograms written in Lolisa. 
According to EVI theory, FEther is essentially a huge function written in Gallina. In this sense, it differs from the real-world 
virtual machines of high-level programing languages such as Smalltalk, Java, and .Net, which support bytecode as their ISA and 
are implemented by translating the bytecodes of commonly used code paths into native machine code. Instead, the ISA of FEther 
comprises the Lolisa semantics, which specify the semantics of the syntax tokens that govern the respective behaviors. The 
validation checking mechanism includes two parts: checking the result validation (including the memory states and values), and 
checking the execution condition. First, because all functions are vulnerable to undefined situations, they are developed with the 
help of effect programing. More specifically, all functions are tagged by an optional type. A valid result is returned in the form 
Some t; an invalid result is returned as an undefined value None. The symbol ⟦𝑡⟧ denotes that term t is tagged by an optional type. 
In the second part, the gas and K limitations are validated by the helper functions 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 and 𝑝𝑢 𝑝𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘, respectively. 
 FEther inherits the low-coupling property from Lolisa. Within the same level, the executable semantics are wholly 
independent, and are encapsulated as modules connected by a set of interfaces. In different levels, the higher-level semantics can 
access the lower-level semantics only via the interfaces, and the implementation details of the lower-level semantics are 
transparent to the higher-level semantics (indicated by dotted lines in Figure 2). Moreover, the implementation of the higher-level 
semantics does not depend on the lower-level semantics. 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of FEther 
 The workflow of FEther is outlined in Figure 3. The user first sets the initial memory state and the target FRWprograms by 
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initializing the formal memory space of GERM and applying the translator. Note that the translator is an optional auxiliary 
component, which translates the Solidity programs into the FRWprograms written in Lolisa. To this end, it searches the abstract 
syntax tree of Lolisa, binds the variable identifiers with a unique memory address, and declares the ML modules. This process can 
also be completed manually. Because the translator is part of FSPVM-E rather than a core component of FEther, it is not further 
discussed in this paper. Next, the FEther parser analyzes the FRWprograms according to the Lolisa abstract syntax tree, and 
invokes the respective executable semantics. The TCOC handles the evaluation requirements, and the results are validated by the 
validation mechanism. Although the validation module is logically independent of the other parts (as mentioned above), it is 
implemented separately in the Formal Interpreter and Formal Semantic modules in real cases. Therefore, the validation module is 
not explicitly defined in Figure 3. The final formal memory state will be assumed in the property theorems. 
 Lolisa is defined by GADT, which guarantees well-formed constructions of the syntax specifications. Thus, the side 
conditions of syntax correctness do not need checking by help functions defined in FEther. The type safety can be checked by the 
type-checking mechanism of Coq. The complete workload of constructing an FEther framework with 100 memory blocks is 
itemized in Table 5. 
 
Figure 3. Workflow of FEther 
 
 Objects Lines in Coq 
Formal Type and Value layer 58 1,347 
Formal Expression layer 46 1,503 
Formal Statement layer 40 741 
Automatic tactic 26 344 
Correctness Lemmas 74 3,746 
Total 244 7,681 
Table 5. Workload statistics for constructing the FEther framework with 100 memory blocks. 
4.2 ISA of FEther 
 The ISA of FEther is the core of the proof engine, which follows the big-step operational semantics of Lolisa. As shown in 
Figure 2, the FEther ISA is separated into three layers. FEther is implemented as described in Appendix A. 
4.2.1 Value layer 
 This project aims to formalize a mechanized syntax and semantics for a subset of the Solidity language, which can be 
directly executed and verified in higher-order logic theorem-proving assistants. Therefore, the Solidity values must be evaluated 
like the native values in the formal system. Ideally, the values of Solidity or some mainstream high-level programing language 
would be explicitly employed in the formal system. Due to the strict typing system of the trusted core and the adoption of different 
paradigms, however, Gallina (Coq) does not directly support array, mapping, and other complex values. Therefore, we must define 
an interlayer between the values of the real-world language and the native values of the formal system. This interlayer directly 
represents the real world-values by an equivalent syntax, and translates them into the native values using formal semantics. 
 After evaluating the Lolisa value by formal executable semantics, the native value information is computed or derived in the 
base formal system, and the respective GERM memory values are determined. In the following sections, ℰ𝒮𝑉 represents the 
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entry point of calling the value semantics, which is abstractedly defined by Rule 3 below. 
                      ℰ𝒮𝑉 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏: 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒.                  (3) 
 Here, the metavariable 𝑣𝑎𝑙  incorporates the Lolisa value 𝑣𝑎𝑙  and the mapping value 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎 . Apart from lacking 
definitions related to mapping type, 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎  has the same static typing rule as 𝑣𝑎𝑙, so the two values can be combined. The 
mapping relation between each Lolisa value and its unique memory value is expressed as ≈. The memory state 𝜎 remains 
unchanged after each value evaluation. Following the definition order given in [14], we then define the computational semantics 
of the Lolisa value. 
 First, we define the computational semantics of the constant values. In Lolisa, the constant values are the set of normal-form 
values, and the set of metavariables 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. The 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡  evaluation process generates the respective memory values for directly 
recording the native value information of the formal system. For example, consider the constant variable 𝑉𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑏): 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 ∈
𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 . The computational semantics of 𝑉𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑏)are defined by Rule 4. We then define ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟) ≈
𝑉𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑛). 
 
         ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 ≡ 𝜆 (𝑛: 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣: 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 : 𝐵𝑙𝑐). 𝑉𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑛) ⇒ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟).          (4) 
 
The computational semantics ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 are summarized in Table A.1 of A. The correctness of ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is certified by Theorem 
1 (the constant-mapping theorem). 
 
Theorem 1 (Constant mapping) For all Lolisa values 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑛), environment values env, and block information 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , the 
mapping ℰ𝒮𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟) ≈ 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑛) holds. 
 
 We then define the semantics of the reference values (the array, mapping, structure and field access values), which are 
needed for accessing the formal memory space and match indexes. The respective values are defined as follows, and the semantics 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 of the array values are defined in Table A.2 of A. Here, 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ is a subsidiary function. Because the Lolisa language 
supports an n-dimensional array (by Rule 6), 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ is a special subsidiary function that searches the memory block indexed by 
the current n-dimensional array index. 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ is also used in the 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟  function. Below we introduce the specific 
implementations of 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ. The abstract function of 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ implementations is given by Rule 5. 
𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ ∷ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠                    (5) 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [𝑖𝑑0 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [𝑖𝑑1 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [… [𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  𝑖𝑑𝑛 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙]]]]                      (6) 
 The mapping value is stored as a singly linked list structure in the GERM memory model, and in the form 
𝑀𝑎𝑝: 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑚𝑎  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) → 𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎 → 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
in Lolisa. In the above expression, the first parameter stores the initial address, the second parameter stores the paired key and 
indexed values, the third and fourth parameters record the key value and indexed value types, respectively, and the fifth parameter 
represents the next address. The Map can be briefly abstracted as Figure 4. In this design, the structure supports the n-dimensional 
mapping datatype. For instance, consider the 2-dimensional mapping datatype  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 [𝜏𝑚𝑎  ⇒  𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 [𝜏𝑚𝑎  ⇒ 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙]] 
in Figure 5. Each memory block in one dimension is the initial block of a respective mapping list in two dimensions. The 
n-dimensional mapping type in Lolisa can be defined by the same process. Obviously, the 𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎  function can be implemented by 
any singly linked list-search algorithm. If the search is successful, the function returns 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟; otherwise, it returns 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 
(see Table A.3 in A). 
 
Figure 4. Abstract structure of a mapping-type memory block 
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
 𝑒 , 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟
 Figure 5. Structure of a 2-dimensional mapping value stored in GERM 
 
 At the value level, a Struct memory value is represented by a struct datatype. Therefore, it resembles a normal-form value, 
and can be extracted directly by 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘  (see Table A.4 of A).  
 The Solidity semantics of field access are very complex and consist of two parts: a contract member access and a struct field 
access. If the contract member access derives from an inheritance relationship or a special identifier, such as the keyword “this”, it 
can be accessed directly through the ML module system. Briefly, the module scope of each function and contract is defined by the 
translator, and can be accessed by the ML module system provided by Coq. If the contract member access derives from a variable, 
the contract information stored in the respective memory block is searched, and the identified member is accessed by the field 
access mechanism of the Coq built-in ML module system. The struct field access semantics are supported by Lolisa. The built-in 
EVM functions in a standard structure, such as msg or block, are of no concern because they are already defined in the Lolisa 
standard library [14]. Therefore, they can be treated as normal structures in the semantics. We denote 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑  as the process of 
evaluating a base address 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  and a struct-type address 𝑎𝑡𝑦 𝑒. Taking  𝑒 0.  𝑒 𝑠. 𝑒 𝑛, 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡, and 𝑎𝑡𝑦 𝑒 as parameters, 
 𝑒 𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑  then seeks the memory value indexed by  𝑒 𝑛. In this process  𝑒 𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑 repeatedly applies 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 to acquire 
the list of member values. If successfully invoked,  𝑒 𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑 returns a pair (𝐷𝑎𝑑, 𝑣). Here, 𝐷𝑎𝑑 refers to the address of 
 𝑒 𝑛−1 because  𝑒 𝑛−1 is an implicit argument to Solidity when  𝑒 𝑛 is a function-call pointer. A common usage in 
Solidity is 𝑎. 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑(𝑣, 𝑠𝑠) ≡ 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑(𝑎, 𝑣, 𝑠𝑠), which indicates that the identifier 𝑎 is a parameter of the 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑 function during 
interpretation or compilation. Therefore, if  𝑣 is a pointer to a function call (𝐹𝑖𝑑(∗)), 𝐷𝑎𝑑 and the function input 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠 
should be combined into  𝑣 to facilitate their transmission to the next level. The above evaluation process is summarized in 
Table A.5 of A. 
4.2.2 Expression Layer 
 The executable semantics of expressions are the rules that acquire the results of the value layer and evaluate the Lolisa 
expression in the memory value of GERM. The evaluation requires the left-value (l-value) and right-value positions, representing 
the memory addresses and the specific memory value, respectively. In the following contents, the entered pointer of the expression 
layer ℰ𝒮𝐸 is defined by Rules 7 and 8. 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏0 𝜏1: 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 𝜏0 𝜏1) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 ,           (7) 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏0 𝜏1: 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 𝜏0 𝜏1) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒.            (8) 
 In formal Lolisa semantics, the modifier expression is a special one that cannot be evaluated in the expression layer (as will 
be later explained in the statement semantics). The computational semantics are defined as follows: 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖 ≡ ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖 ≡  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟. 
 
Expressions in the l-value position: The following rules define the semantics of evaluating the expressions in the l-value position 
(i.e., the respective memory address). The expressions in the l-value position, which can be constructed by the Econst constructor, 
represent Lolisa values at the expression level. Specifically, the left values can be assigned as the Econst specified by Varray and 
Vmap. As mentioned previously, Varray and Vmap are address pointers to values stored in specific memory blocks. This construct 
(shown in Example 1) is commonly used in most general-purpose programing languages.  
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𝐴[𝑖] = 𝑎; (Example I). 
Thus, Varray and Vmap can represent not only memory values, but also memory addresses. Note that the remaining values 
(Vstruct and Vfield) are also address pointers by specifying the Econst constructor, but cannot represent the expressions in the 
l-value position. Because Evar can represent any variables address using any types, including structure and field access values. To 
avoid confusion between Evar and Econst specified by Vstruct and Vfield, we set the convention that Vstruct and Vfield represents 
only the memory value at the value level. In both Solidity and Lolisa, Vfield admits many special structures, such as msg and 
block, whose members cannot be changed at will. In rare cases, Solidity allows field-access expressions in the left position. 
Therefore, to ensure that Lolisa remains well-formed and well-behaved, the left value in expressions cannot be evaluated by Vfield. 
The fields of structures can be changed by invoking Estruct to change all fields, or by declaring a new field, as explained below. 
Although the limitations of Vstruct and Vfield are inconvenient for programmers and verifiers, they avoid any potential risk. 
 Therefore, if the constructor is Varray, the semantics are chosen as ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  (defined in Table A.6 of A); if the 
constructor is Vmap, they are chosen as ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑝 (Table A.7 of A). The other constructors return None directly. The semantics 
of the left constant value ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡 at the expression level are then given in Table A.8 of A. The IRE problem is avoided by 
introducing a special helper function 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 , which encapsulates the matching tree for obtaining the value information 
recorded in valid constructors. 
 The reference expressions Evar, Efun, Econ, and Epar need only to return their addresses directly. In Table A.9 of A, these 
reference expressions are summarized as 𝐸𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧): 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧) 𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧). The Estruct, Ebop, and 
Euop expressions can only be assigned as right expression values, so their semantics are banned by the 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 function 
(which returns an undefined result None). 
 
Expressions in the r-value position: The following functions describe the semantics of evaluating expressions in the r-value 
position (i.e., the respective memory values). The evaluation of constant expressions is given in Table A.10 of A. Assisted by 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑒, the ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡 directly provides the respective memory value.  
 According to Convention 1, the struct constructor Estruct represents an expression value at the right position, which is the 
only way to initialize or modify struct-type terms. The semantics of the right struct value are defined in Table A.11 of A. The 
helper function 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑟 contains the type matching and value evaluation. The type matching part checks whether the type of each 
value satisfies the respective field. The second part recursively invokes ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑒  to evaluate the values in the respective memory 
values. If the evaluation process yields a None message, the Estruct evaluation has failed. Otherwise, the members’ value set is 
retrieved and the respective struct memory value is returned. 
 The semantics of the address-pointer expressions are defined in Table A.12 of A. As shown in the formal semantic definitions, 
the results are obtained by applying 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 directly. 
 Finally, the semantics of the binary and unary operations are defined in Tables A.13 and A.14 of A, respectively. Because of 
the static-type limitation in the formal abstract syntax definition based on GADTs, all expressions, sub-expressions and operations 
are well-formed, and the semantics do not need to check the type dependence relation. Therefore, subsidiary assist functions are 
not required. The functions 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑜  and 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑜  take the results of the expression evaluations and the required operations as 
arguments, and combine them to generate new memory values. In the present version of FEther, the above definition forbids 
mixed arithmetic operations, such as “int + float,” because Solidity does not completely support the float datatype, and float 
values are rarely employed in smart contract programs. Therefore, mixed-arithmetic operations would add unnecessary 
complexity and computational burden when implementing the formal interpreter. 
4.2.3 Statement Layer 
 Having defined the semantics, we can now define the statement layer. Statement semantics parse the FRWprograms written 
by Lolisa, and evaluate the new memory states. The semantics of the sequence statements are not explicitly defined, and the 
relevant statement definitions are modified to improve the extremely low computational efficiency of solving the CBNT problem. 
We express the evaluation process of a statement as ℰ𝒮𝑆, and give its abstract definition as Rule 9. 
                           ℰ𝒮𝑆 ∷ ℤ →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟 .           (9) 
Most statement evaluations employ the helper function  𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 , which takes the current environment env and the 
super-environment fenv as arguments, and checks the conditions (gas limitation and execution-level validity). For example, if the 
domains in env and fenv are equal but have different execution levels, the program is terminated and env is reset by fenv. If 
𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 returns a true result, the current statements are executed; otherwise, the program is terminated and the initial memory 
state is restored. 
 Contract declarations are among the most important Solidity statements. Contract declaration in Lolisa involves two 
operations. First, the consistency of the inheritance information is checked using the helper function 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 , which 
determines whether the current inheritance relation 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠  is stored in the current module context 𝒞 . 
The function 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘  is defined as a sum type in Rule 10: 
        𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 ≡ ∀ (𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐 : 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠), {𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐} + {𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 ≠ 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐}.      (10) 
Second, the initial contract information, including all member identifiers, is written into a designated memory block by the 
assistant function 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 . The formal semantics of the contract declaration are defined in Table A.15 of A. 
 Variable declaration is a basic task in Lolisa. The function 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟  is a special case of 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 , with type given by Rule 11. 
         𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟 ∷  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟 .             (11) 
This function takes the current memory state, variable type, indexed address, and environment information as parameters, and 
initializes the respective memory block. Being based on the GERM memory model, the initialization and location processes of 
this term with the array datatype differ from those in standard researches on formalizing array types. The function 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟  calls 
the 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  function to initialize the respective terms. 
 In Yang et al. [14], normal types are datatypes whose typing rules disallow recursive definition. A normal type is assigned as 
𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 . The type 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  is the recursive base of a multidimensional array. In other words, if the 𝜏 of the current element is 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙, 
it represents the final dimension of the recursive definition of the current multidimensional array.  
 Particularly, because each memory block in the GERM memory model directly stores all logic information with type value 
[6], regardless of the sizes of the array elements, we only need to calculate the number of logic elements in the array. For example, 
consider the following three-dimensional array 𝑎[2][3][2] with type 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑑(2) 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑑(3) 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑑(2) 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙]]]. 
The full tree structure of this array is given in Figure 6, and the mathematical evaluation process is shown as follows: 
                                    (𝑠𝑖 𝑒1 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1 ∗ (𝑠𝑖 𝑒2 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒2 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒3)) 
                                    = (2 + 2 ∗ (3 + 3 ∗ 2)) 
                                    = 20. 
. Note that this array requires a memory allocation of 20 blocks.  
 
 
Figure 6. Example of a 3-dimensional array 
 The array-size calculation can be summarized as Rule 13. Using this formula, we can implement the subsidiary function 
𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  to calculate and return the number of blocks allocated to arrays in each dimension. The abstract of this assignment is 
defined in Rule 14. Note that 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1 in Rules 12 and 13 represents the size of the current dimension rather than the size of the first 
dimension. For example, to calculate the 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  of the second dimension of 𝑎[2][3][2], we should replace 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1
 = 2 in 
Rules 12 and 13 with 𝑠𝑖 𝑒2
 = 3. 
 𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑖 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎 2 3 2
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 1 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 1 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 2
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 2 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 2 1
2𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 3𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑖 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ≡ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1 ∗ (𝑠𝑖 𝑒2 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒2 ∗ (… (𝑠𝑖 𝑒𝑛−1 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒𝑛−1 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒𝑛))) ≡ ∑ ∏ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 .       (12) 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  / 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1 ≡ (∑ ∏ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) / 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1.                        (13) 
𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 ∷ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ℤ.                           (14) 
 
 Figure 7 shows the initialization process of 𝑎[2][3][2], which follows its tree structure. In step (1), FEther searches a 
continuous memory space with a total size of 20 blocks, according to Rule (12). The algorithm Tree Initialization then classifies 
𝑎[2][3][2] as two initial trees, indexed by 𝑎[0] and 𝑎[ ]. The elements in both groups are then recursively initialized 
by 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 in sequence. For example, in the recursion of 𝑎[0], 𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  calculates the size of the group indexed by 𝑎[0] as 
(𝑠𝑖 𝑒1
 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1
 ∗ (𝑠𝑖 𝑒2
 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒2
 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒3
 )) / 𝑠𝑖 𝑒1
  =  0 blocks from 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 0 to 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 9. Step (2) allocates the memory blocks. 
Because 𝑎[0] is also the beginning address of the whole array, it is allocated to 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 0 (deep blue block in Step (2) of Figure 7). 
To allocate the memory blocks of the second dimension, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  must proceed to the next level and recursively initialize the 
sub-groups indexed by 𝑎[0][0], 𝑎[0][ ], and 𝑎[0][2]. In Step (3), the information of the group indexed by 𝑎[0][0] is stored in 
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 1, which requires (𝑠𝑖 𝑒2
 + 𝑠𝑖 𝑒2
 ∗ 𝑠𝑖 𝑒3
 ) / 𝑠𝑖 𝑒2
 = 3 blocks from 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 1 to 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 3 (green block in Step (3) of Figure 
7). To allocate the memory blocks of the third dimension, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  continues the deep recursion in Steps (4) and (5), which 
initialize 𝑎[0][0][𝑋], 𝑋 ∈ {0, }. The elements in 𝑎[0][0][𝑋] are of type 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 , so this is the leaf-node level with a group size of 
𝑠𝑖 𝑒3
  / 𝑠𝑖 𝑒3
 =  . In other words, 𝑎[0][0][0] and 𝑎[0][0][ ] are single-element groups. Both groups are contiguously stored in 
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 2 and 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 3 (orange block in Step (4) of Figure 7). Steps (6)–(8) restore the memory state  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒0 to the recursion 
level of the second dimension, and repeat Steps (3)–(5) for 𝑎[0][ ][𝑋]. This process repeats for the remaining groups, until the 
whole array information has been stored into respective memory blocks. The final structure of 
𝑎[2][3][2] in the memory space, from 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 0 to 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 19, is shown in Figure 8. Here, the left column (9) is the real structure 
and the right column (10) is the group classification. 
 
Figure 7. Array value initializing process (see text for details) 
 
Figure 8. Final structure of the 𝑎[2][3][2] array in GERM memory space 
 The 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ can be implemented by a similar algorithm. However, as 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ  directly locates the indexed group rather 
…
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
…
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 0
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 1
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 2
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 3
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 9
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 10
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 19
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 0
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 1
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 2
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 3
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 9
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 1
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 2
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 3
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 2
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 3
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0  
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 1
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 2 3   
   
…
 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1
…
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 2 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 1 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2 0
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 0 2 1
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1
…
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑎 1 2 1
  0
than searching each group, its core procedure is 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡(+, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟). The offset formula is given as Rule 15. For 
example, when locating the block of 𝑎[0][ ][ ], the offset is calculated as 0 ∗  0 +  ∗ 3 +  ∗  + 2 =  , and the initial address 
is 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐 0. Therefore, the information of 𝑎[0][ ][ ] is stored in 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐  . 
𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≡ ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + (𝑛 −  ) .                                (15) 
 Generally, if 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝜏) ∧ 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐( 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) = 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, the array space can be initialized by Algorithm 1, 
called Tree Initialization. 
 
Algorithm 1. Algorithm of the 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  function 
Algorithm Tree Initialization 
Function: Fixpoint 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦  
Input: Initial K steps, initial memory state  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, current initial address, array type, current environment env; 
Output: The final memory state signed with optional type; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟎: if 𝜏 = 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  [𝑖𝑑 𝜏𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒] ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 < 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 , then move to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏, else return to 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝2; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏: 𝒍𝒆𝒕 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
 ≔ 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟( 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦𝑖), 
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 (𝐾 −  , 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
 , (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡(+, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒)) , 𝜏𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 , 𝑒𝑛𝑣); 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐: if 𝜏 ∈ 𝜏𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 < 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 , then move to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑, else return  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑: 𝒍𝒆𝒕 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
  ≔ 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟( 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦𝑖), 
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 (𝐾 −  , 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
  , (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡(+, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒)) , 𝜏𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒); 
 
 After running this algorithm, the symbolic execution in FEther more accurately simulates the initialization and allocation 
behavior of an n-dimensional array in real hardware than other formalizations using the list datatype. An array can be abstracted 
by a number of interesting algorithms, such as tree structure mapping [26] or graphic mapping [27], but the advantages of these 
algorithms are partially offset by disadvantages. For example, although they can represent an infinite memory space, their 
specifications and formal structures are very complex and difficult to extend. Moreover, to modify an array element, an operation 
must search each node one by one, and the overflow problem is difficult to check without a dependent type. In an algorithm based 
on the GERM memory model, the array is stored in a fixed-size contiguous memory space without assistance by a dependent type 
[28]. Verifiers can formally simulate the address offsetting process, check the array overflow problem by checking the head Flag 
stored in the memory block, and modify an array block directly by indexing the respective memory address. Consequently, the 
verification process becomes easier and more accurate. 
 Assuming that the current logic context based on GERM has sufficient logic memory space, and that each identifier has a 
valid and free address, 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟  represents the first time of setting the indexed memory block, and 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 is always successful. 
The variable declaration semantics in this scenario are defined in Table A.16 of A. 
 The semantics of the structure datatype declaration are defined in Table A.17 of A. By Convention 1, the structure declaration 
at the statement level declares a new structure type with address identifier 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏. The field member list of 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏 is  𝑒 𝑠𝜏 . As an 
example, Figure 9 defines the built-in address datatype of Solidity rewritten by Lolisa. The _0xaddress is the 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏, and the 
remaining fields are the  𝑒 𝑠𝜏 . The ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟  records the struct type information directly into the memory block with address 
𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏. 
 
Address ≝ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑒 _0xaddress (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑚 TInt (Nvar addr) 
    𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑚 TInt (Nvar balance) 
    𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑚 (Tfid (Some _Send)) (Nvar send) 
    𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑚 TInt (Nvar gas) (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑙))))) _0xaddress 2 occupy) 
Figure 9. Address type declaration in Solidity, and its equivalent special struct type in Lolisa syntax 
 
 In Lolisa, a function call statement unfolds the function body stored in the respective memory address. The semantics of a 
function call ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 are given in Table A.18 of A. In the first step, the function call attempts to read the function declaration 
statements stored in the respective memory address. If the readout is successful, the second step sets the current execution 
environment level to 0, and (with the assistance of 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑣) sets the domain as the called function identifier. In the final step, the  
function body is executed with the new  nv’. 
 The semantics of the for and while loops in Lolisa are also similar to those of other well-known languages. The semantics 
incorporate four conditions: 1) continuation to the next loop, 2) exiting from the current loop during a loop failure, 3) breaking 
from the current loop, and 4) exiting from the current loop after a None message. Because FEther incorporates the BMC model, 
the loops are unfolded as special sequence statements. Specifically, ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟  and ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒  are simplified as two-step functions. 
First, they judge condition 𝑒 in its current memory state. Second, if the result of 𝑒 is true, they evaluate the loop body and 
transmit the new memory state and loop body into ℰ𝒮𝑆; otherwise, they transmit the current memory state and the next statement 
into ℰ𝒮𝑆. The subsidiary function 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙  is an intermediate interface that avoids the IRE problem. The pattern matching 
mechanism of Coq requires the listing of all value-type constructors, even though the GADTs of Lolisa guarantee that if ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟  
is evaluated successfully, the return value of 𝑒 takes the form 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑏, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟). To hide the useless information, 
𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙  extracts the native Boolean value 𝑏 ∷ 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙. In this way, the branches in the current context need only to list the true and 
false constructors. The semantics of the for and while loops are defined in Tables A.19 and A.20 of A, respectively. 
 Modifier declarations are special function declarations requiring three steps, and including a single limitation. The parameter 
values are set by the 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑟  predicate. As defined by Table A.21 in A, the first step initializes and sets the parameters. The second 
step stores the modifier body into the respective memory block, and the third step attempts to initialize the return address 𝛬𝑓 𝑛. 
Under the rules of Solidity, the modifier body can return the checking flag, but cannot change the memory states. Therefore, in 
FEther, we add a special Boolean-type memory block in the GERM framework, indexed by _0xmodifer. If the modifier checking 
is successful, the block is set to true and assigned as 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝑟 𝑒; otherwise, it is set to false and assigned as 𝜎𝑚𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 , meaning that 
other blocks cannot be modified. 
 To guarantee the type safety, Lolisa separately defines the single- and multi-return value functions. As shown in Table A.22 
of A, however, we combine them such that the return type and modifier limitation are both defined as lists. The evaluation is 
completed by the 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 function. Unlike modifier semantics, the function semantics check the modifier limitations restricting 
the function. Specifically, all modifiers restricting the function are executed before the function is invoked. If the  𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘 
result of a modifier evaluation is true, the function is executed; otherwise, it is terminated. Particularly, if  𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘  finds a 
modified memory state, the execution is discarded. 
 The conditional-statement semantics (see Table A.23 of A) are similar to those of other well-known languages. Under the 
following rules, ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟  returns a Boolean result. 
 Assignment-statement semantics are based on the expression-evaluation semantics. If the result of evaluating an r-value 
expression is a function pointer generated by a field access, then the return values are evaluated by function call semantics. The 
semantics of assignment statements are defined in Table A.24 of A. 
 The returned expressions are evaluated by expression semantics. Valid results are written into their respective Λ𝑓 𝑛. The 
ℰ𝒮𝑆 then converts the domain of the current environment into a super-domain. Obviously, any statements after the return 
statement will be stopped by 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘. Note that because of the GADT, each expression has a different datatype that cannot be 
stored in a normal list. Therefore, the 𝑒𝑠 is defined as a heterogeneous list storing expressions of different types, and 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑠 
is a subsidiary function that evaluates all expressions by repeating the ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟  process. The semantics of return and 
multiple-return statements are defined in Tables 25 and 26 of A, respectively. 
 Finally, Table A.27 of A defines the skip statement Snil (which prohibits changes in the skipped part), the throw statement 
Throw (a special kind of Solidity statement that stops the current program and sets the memory state as 𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡), and the function 
stop statement FunStop (a conventional Lolisa statement that represents the completed execution of all statements in the function 
bodies with no return statements, and resets the current environment). 
4.3 The FEther Parser 
 To analyze the syntactic units of FRWprograms, the semantics must be integrated into a parser that is easily implemented on 
the ISA. As shown in Figure 2, the parser has three layers for parsing the three syntax layers. The functions of these layers are 
validating the environment, deconstructing the input syntactic units, mapping the syntactic units 𝒮𝑖 into the respective semantics 
ℰ𝒮𝑖, and transmitting the information stored in the 𝒮𝑖 to the ℰ𝒮𝑖. As an example, consider the value layer in Table 6. First, the 
ℰ𝒮𝑉 checks the K limitation. It then deconstructs the input value 𝑣 into specific constructors by pattern matching. Finally, the 
logic data are transmitted into their respective semantics. 
Therefore, the parsers can be summarized as the typing judgements 16 and 17, where 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 denotes the validation process. 
ℰ ⊢ 𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣           𝛭 ⊢ 𝜎,𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝐾,𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣)=𝑡𝑟 𝑒
𝒮𝑖 ≈ ℰ𝒮𝑖
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝒮𝑖(𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠) ⇒ ℰ𝒮𝑖(𝜎,𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟,𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠)
 (16) 
ℰ ⊢ 𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣           𝛭 ⊢ 𝜎,𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟       ℱ ⊢ 𝐾
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝐾,𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣)=𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
𝒮𝑖 ≈ ℰ𝒮𝑖
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝒮𝑖(𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠) ⇒ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒
 (17) 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑉 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏: 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑉 ≡ 
  𝜆 (𝐾: ℤ). 𝜆(𝑣: (∀ 𝜏: 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏)). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣: 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎: 𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟: 𝐵𝑙𝑐). 
  {| 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 ⟼ 
      {| 𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝜏, 𝑛) ⟼ (𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟: 𝐵𝑙𝑐). ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟)) 
        𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎 (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, 𝜏, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒) ⟼ (𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟: 𝐵𝑙𝑐). ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟)) 
        … 
     |}. 𝑣 
   𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 
  |}. 𝐾𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝐾) 
Table 6. Simple example of the value-layer parser 
 
 The information in 𝒮𝑖 needs to be partially preprocessed before transmission to ℰ𝒮𝑖. First, we must check whether the 
constructor of ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 is 𝐸𝑓𝑢𝑛. If true, we must transmit the respective 𝛬𝑓 𝑛 instead of 𝑛𝑎 𝑒. This action is recorded as 
{|  𝐸𝑓𝑢𝑛(𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝜏,∗)  ⟼  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝛬𝑓 𝑛) |} . 𝑒. As mentioned above, after evaluating ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑟𝑒  and ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 , we 
must then change the current environment into a super-environment for stopping the function execution. Moreover, as semantics 
such as ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 , ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑝 and ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑢𝑜𝑝 recursively invoke ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟 , the specific ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟  and ℰ𝒮𝑆 must be defined as 
recursive functions. Finally, the parser statement level integrates the two lower levels, and also defines the entering point of 
FEther (see the FEther_enter_point algorithm given as Algorithm 2). 
 
Algorithm 2. Algorithm of the FEther entering point 
Algorithm FEther_enter_point 
Function: Fixpoint FEther 
Input: Initial K steps, optional initial memory state ⟦ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⟧, current environment env, and super-environment 
fenv; initial arguments 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, and valid 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 ; 
Output: The final memory state signed with optional type; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟎: if 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ∧ ⟦ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⟧ ≠ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒, then move to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏, else return ⟦ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⟧; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟏: if 𝐹𝑅𝑊𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎 = 𝑠0 ∷ 𝑠1, set 𝑒𝑛𝑣
 = 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑣(𝑠0 ∷ 𝑠1, 𝑒𝑛𝑣) and move to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐, else return 
⟦ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒⟧; 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟐: if 𝒮0 ≈ ℰ𝒮0 then (𝐾, , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, ℰ𝒮0) ⇓𝑃(𝑠 )
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
→   ⟦ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
 ⟧ and move to 𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑, else return 
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒. 
𝑺𝒕𝒆𝒑𝟑: 𝐹𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑟(⟦ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
 ⟧, 𝑒𝑛𝑣 , 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑠1) 
 
 The rules governing the execution of a Lolisa program in FEther are defined by the rules EXE-F and EXE-IF below, where 
the symbol ∞ refers to infinite execution, and T is the termination condition set of a finite execution. 
 
ℰ⊢𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣           𝛭⊢𝜎,𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟            ℱ ⊢ 𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑠           ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)         ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑙𝑖𝑏
𝑒𝑛𝑣=𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠(𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)))           𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣=𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡))
𝜎=𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡),𝑙𝑖𝑏)
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝐹𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟(⟦𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
′ ⟧,𝑒𝑛𝑣′ ,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠,𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)) 
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒,𝑇
⇒         〈𝜎′,𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣〉
 (EXE-F), 
ℰ⊢𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣         𝛭⊢𝜎,𝑏𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟          ℱ ⊢ 𝑜 𝑎𝑟𝑠         ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)        ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝑙𝑖𝑏
𝑒𝑛𝑣=𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠(𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)))         𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣=𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑣(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡))
𝜎=𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚(𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡),𝑙𝑖𝑏)
ℰ,𝛭,ℱ ⊢ 𝐹𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟(⟦𝑚𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
′ ⟧,𝑒𝑛𝑣′,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣,𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠,𝑃(𝑠𝑡𝑡)) 
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒,∞
⇒          〈𝜎′,𝑒𝑛𝑣′ ,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣〉 ∨ 𝑒𝑛𝑣′.(𝑔𝑎𝑠)→(¬𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣.(𝑔𝑎𝑠𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡)) 
 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑒,𝑇
⇒          〈𝜎′,𝑒𝑛𝑣′,𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣〉
 (EXE-IF). 
4.4 Automation tactics 
 Automated theorem proving is a core topic in formal verification research. Many higher-order theorem-proving assistants 
provide tactics or similar mechanisms that simplify the program evaluation process and construct proofs automatically. With 
manual modeling technology, different formal models with significantly different structures and verification processes can be 
constructed in various programs. Hence, designing a set of tactics that automatically verifies models in different programs is 
nearly impossible. 
 The above problem is circumvented by FEther. According to EVI theory, the FEther symbolic execution corresponds to both 
the function evaluation and the program verification (see Rule 18). In other words, it unifies the verification processes of different 
programs in higher-order theorem-proving assistants by simplifying the program evaluation process in FEther. Because the 
situations of FEther execution constitute a fixed and finite set {𝑠0, 𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑚}, we can design sufficiently many sub-tactics for all 
situations. Exploiting this advantage and assisted by the Ltac mechanism, we designed primitive automatic tactics for the FEther. 
The tactic strategy model is constructed from three parts: memory operating, K costing and semantics simplifying.  
                                    𝛺,𝛭,ℱ ⊢𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑃𝑒 𝑒 ≡ 𝑃𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 ≡ 𝑃𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦 .                                   (18) 
 The workflow is defined in Figure 10. When the proof universe of Coq is open, the 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 function scans the current 
context 𝐶 to obtain the current goal. In sequence, each part attempts to capture the operation characteristic of the current goal and 
choose the matching tactics. The selected tactics are combined into a solution tactic 𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑖 that solves the goal in TCOC. The new 
context 𝐶′ is compared with 𝐶 in 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑐. If 𝐶′ and 𝐶 are identical, the current tactics cannot solve the goal automatically, 
and the tactic model is terminated. Otherwise, the tactic model continuously attempts to simplify the goal of 𝐶′. 
 
Figure 10. An abstract automatic tactic working process 
 Algorithm 3 states the unfold_modify tactic, a sub-tactic of the memory operation part. This sub-tactic captures parts of the 
operation characteristic of the 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟  function, and evaluates the scanned 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟  using basic built-in tactics. 
 
Algorithm 3. Sub-tactic for capturing the operation characteristic of the 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 function 
Ltac unfold_modify:= 
  match goal with 
   | [ |- context [?Y (?X: memory) (?Z: value)]] ⇒ unfold Y in *; cbn in * 
  end. 
 
 The average ratios of contract size to proof size are shown in Table 7. Smart contracts exceeding 500 lines were excluded 
from this analysis, because the size of large contracts were limited by the gas cost. The second and third columns of Table 7 list 
the ratios using Coq’s built-in tactics and our automatic tactics, respectively. Obviously, the automatic tactics reduce much of the 
proof workload. Moreover, according to our experimental results, the ratio floats in a range is influenced by the complexity of the 
target contract. Specifically, the ratios obtained by the built-in tactics range from approximately −0.   to +  0.0, whereas those 
of the automatic tactics range from approximately −0.  to + 0.3. Therefore, the automatic tactics possess a better universal 
property than the directly applied built-in tactics. 
 
𝑇𝐶 𝐶 𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑖  , 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝐶
𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙  𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑐 𝑖
𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐸 𝐸 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙  𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑐𝐸 𝐸𝑖
𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙  𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑐 𝑖
 
 
𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑖 , 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑐 𝐶, 𝐶′ ⇒ 𝐶
 
𝐶 ≠ 𝐶′
𝐶 
 Contract size Built-in tactics Automatic tactic 
≤ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬 1.27 0.16 
≤ 𝟐𝟎𝟎 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬 2.33 0.13 
≤ 𝟑𝟎𝟎 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬 5.26 0.17 
≤ 𝟒𝟎𝟎 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬 7.5 0.22 
≤ 𝟓𝟎𝟎 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬 10.3 0.17 
Table 7. Ratios of proof size to contract size in theorem-proving tactics 
4.5 Self-correctness Certification 
 The FEther interpreter is entirely constructed in Coq, which confers a natural advantage over other program verifications and 
analysis tools. The core of Coq is the trusted computation base (TCB) [24], which satisfies the de Bruijn criterion. In almost all 
program analysis tools, TCB self-verification is arguable and paradoxical, so whether the TCB of a program verification (analysis) 
tool satisfies the de Bruijn criterion is an important indicator of the trustworthiness of the verification. 
 The correctness of FEther is certified by its consistency between the relational and computational definitions, the correctness 
of its essential properties, and the meta-properties of its semantics. 
 First, we must prove that the operational semantics [30] of Lolisa (the inductive relational forms) are equivalent to the 
operational semantics (the executable function forms). As desired in the CompCert project [26], we check whether each evaluation 
in the relation semantics corresponds to the symbolic execution in the executable semantics. For this purpose, we construct a 
simulation diagram. Under identical conditions, the relational and executable semantics must have the same observable effect 
(same traces of the evaluation process). This requirement is embodied in the following simulation diagram theory. 
 
Theorem (simulation diagram) Let ℰ,𝛭, ℱ ⊢𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝜎, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟  be the initial evaluation environment, and let 𝑅𝑒𝑞 
represent the equivalence relationship between two terms. Then, any relational semantic 𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑙  and executable semantic 𝑆𝑒 𝑒 must 
satisfy the following simulation diagram: 
 
 Second, we must certify the correctness of the foundation behavior of the executable semantics. As a simple instance, we 
construct Lemma test_lemma_if_false, which certifies the correctness of the following execution: For all statements 𝑠 and 𝑠′, if 
the if statement condition is false, FEther must execute the statement 𝑠′ of the false branch. By a similar process, we certified that 
almost all of the executable semantics exhibit standard behaviors. 
 
Lemma (test_lemma_if_false) 
 ∀ 𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝑠 𝑠′ 𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠, 
  𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 =  𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 (𝑉𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) → 
  𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (𝐼𝑓 𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒  𝑠 𝑠
 )  → 
  𝑛 > 0 → 
  (𝐹𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑚  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) = (𝐹𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡_  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑠(𝑒𝑛𝑣) 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑠′). 
 
 Finally, we prove the meta-properties of these semantics. The most basic properties in each layer are the progress and 
preservation properties, which maintain the static-type safety of the specification. For example, the progress and preservation of 
the expression layer are defined in Lemma expression type safety. Because Lolisa is a strongly typed language defined in terms of 
GADTs, the progress and preservation properties of expressions are easily proven by simplifying the semantics function. The 
progress and preservation properties of other layers are certified similarly. Besides the meta-properties, we proved the execution 
𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑙
𝑆𝑒 𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡′
𝑆𝑒 𝑒 𝑛, 𝜎, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟
ℰ,𝛭, ℱ ⊢𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝜎, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, ⇓ 𝑟𝑒𝑙
ℰ,𝛭, ℱ ⊢𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝜎, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑅𝑒𝑞 𝑅𝑒𝑞
determinism of all semantics in Coq. The Lemma execution determinism is one example of the relevant proofs. 
 
Lemma (expression type safety) 
 1. If 𝑒: 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏  and 𝑒 ⟼ 𝑒
 , then 𝑒′: 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 ′  𝜏 . 
 2. If 𝑒: 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 , then either 𝑒(𝑣) or some 𝑒
  exists such that 𝑒 ⟼ 𝑒 . 
 
Lemma (execution determinism) 
 ∀ 𝑠  ⟦ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⟧ ⟦ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
 ⟧ 𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠, 
  𝐹𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑛  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑠 = ⟦ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⟧ → 
  𝐹𝐸𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑛  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑠 = ⟦ 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
 ⟧ → 
   𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 =  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
  
 
 At present, the core functions have been completely verified. The correctness certification includes 74 theorems and lemmas, 
and approximately 4000 lines of Coq proof code. 
5 Formal verification of smart contract by FEther 
 To demonstrate the power of FEther in real-world practice, this section verifies the smart contract in a case study that 
demonstrates our proof engine and its benefits. The experimental environment was five identical personal computers with 
equivalent hardware of 8 GB memory and a 3.20 GHz CPU. All computers were run on Windows 10 and CoqIDE 8.8. For readers’ 
benefit, the code of the examples is given in Appendix B. 
5.1 Case Study: Hybrid Verification 
 As a simple example, we consider the wallet function encoded in Appendix B. This function, which executes initial coin 
offering, is a segment of the Solidity contract extracted from the contract demonstration [2]. 
 First, the smart contract in its formal version was translated line-byline into Lolisa. The result is shown in Figure 11. Among 
the most important functions of wallet is the application time validation. Clearly, the contract will be discarded if the current time 
now are below privilegeOpen or above privilegeClose. 
 
Figure 11. Formal version of the wallet function 
 According to EVI theory, verification in the proposed FSPVM is founded on simultaneous Hoare logic and reachability logic. 
Meanwhile, verification in FEther combines higher-order theorem proving and symbolic execution. By virtue of this hybrid 
system, programmers can mechanically define the Hoare style properties following the formula abstract (19), where the wildcard 
“*”represents other specific arguments. 
P{minit} FEther(minit , FRWprograms,∗) Q{mfinal}.        (19) 
 According to the reachability logic, the Hoare logic derivation is equivalent to the trusted operational semantics execution. 
Therefore, the execution of FEther can be seen as a derivation based on Hoare logic. The inference process is given by expression 
(20). The specific initial memory state  𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the precondition of the program verification. Guided by the semantics of each 
statement ci, FEther logically modifies the current memory state  𝑖−1 to a new postcondition 𝑄𝑖{ 𝑖} (i.e., the precondition of 
ci). The theorems need only judge wither the final output memory state  𝑛 after executing the final statement matches the 
correct memory state  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 . Most importantly, this verification procedure is automated in the proposed FSPVM. 
P{minit}c0
FInterpreter(minit,c )
→                Q0{m0}c1
FInterpreter(m ,c )
→              Q1{m1}c2 ↠ cnQn{mn}
?
↔Q{mfinal}.   (20) 
During this process, verifiers can alter the verification patterns (including static, concolic, and selective symbolic execution) by 
defining the preconditions in different ways. For example, programmers can vary the wallet function by the following three 
approaches. 
 When the initial arguments are inductively defined with quantifiers such as ∀ and ∃, the traditional symbolic execution will 
traverse all cases. If the current time 𝑛𝑜𝑤 in the wallet function is outside the range 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 to 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒, the smart contract must be 
discarded. The Lemma no_in_time defined in Figure 12 underlined in red abstractedly defines (INT I   Unsigned? 𝑋) and 
(INT I   Unsigned? 𝑌)  by specifying ? 𝑋  and ? 𝑌  as inductive values representing all possible situations, namely, as 
∀ (x: Int)(INT I   Unsigned x)  and  ∀ (y: Int)(INT I   Unsigned y), respectively.  Using the automatic tactics of FEther, 
programmers can execute and complete this verification within 3.37 s (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 12. Verification process of wallet with abstract symbol arguments 
 
Figure 13. Execution time of verifying wallet with abstract symbol arguments 
 Second, FEther supports concolic symbolic execution that gets real inputs. To accurately simulate execution processes on 
real world hardware, FEther is built in a virtual execution environment. Therefore, a FEther execution can be regarded as a special 
dynamic analysis. As shown in Figure 14, the entering points test and code wallet are unmodified, and privilegeOpen, 
proviledgeClose and now are replaced with specific values 0, 3, and 4, respectively. The other constraints are still inductively 
defined as abstract symbols. The function correctness of concolic execution with specific inputs is then proven by the no_in_time 
lemma. Because the inputs are specified, the number of possible execution paths is limited, and the execution time reduces to 
1.689 s (see Figure 15). Of course, to test the function of wallet within a special test suite, programmers can write an automatic 
test script that modifies the values of privilegeOpen, proviledgeClose and now. 
 
Figure 14. Concolic verification of the wallet function 
 
Figure 15. Concolic execution time of wallet function 
 Third, the wallet function can be varied by exploiting the selective symbolic execution of FEther. As shown in Figure 16, 
programmers can extract the core code segment if (now <  open || now >  close) {throw(); }from the wallet function and 
represent it by a new definition such as m p’ underlined in red, which can be individually verified by the msp_correct lemma. 
After combining the verified m p’ into the wallet function, the verification of the no_in_time lemma can be finished by invoking 
the msp_correct lemma. Clearly, the msp_correct can also assist the proofs that use the m p’ code segment. 
 
Figure 16. Selective symbolic execution of the wallet function 
 The FEther can also simplify loop proofs. In the standard approach of higher-order theorem proving, program loops are 
proven by manually identifying the invariants. Searching the loop invariants of simple loops, however, is a tedious process. By 
combining symbolic execution and higher-order theorem proving, we simultaneously facilitate the use of BMC and the search for 
loop invariants. Employing BMC, we first limit FEther to K or fewer executions of FRWprogram. In general, if L executions 
(where L ≤ K) of an FRWprogram can generate the corresponding final memory state, the loops existing in the FRWprogram can 
be directly unfolded as a set of identical normal-sequence statements within finite time, as inferred from Rule 21. If the 
FRWprogram fails to generate the corresponding final memory state after K executions, we can set the loop statement as a 
breakpoint (by virtue of the selective symbolic execution) and separate the FRWprogram into two parts, denoted as the head and 
tail parts. Next, we must locate the loop invariants and encapsulate them into an invariant memory state I{mi}, which serves as 
the final memory state of the head part and the initial memory state of the tail part. This procedure is embodied in Rule 21 below. 
P{minit}c0 ↠ ciI{mi}(head) and ciI{mi} ↠ cnQ{mfinal}(tail).      (21) 
Under the composition rule of Hoare logic, we have P{minit}c0 ↠ cnQ{mfinal}. In this way, simple loops can be proven 
automatically, reducing the workload of searching loop invariants. Moreover, complex loops that cannot be verified by model 
checking and symbolic execution technology can be proved by higher-order theorem-proving technology. 
 Finally, the FEther provides a debug mechanism for users. Because FEther is developed in the GERM memory model, it 
provides debug tactics such as step, which enables step-by-step debugging of a smart contract. The formal intermediate memory 
states obtained during the execution and verification process of a Lolisa program using FEther are shown in the proof context 
(right panel of Figure 17). Programmers can follow the intermediate memory states to locate the bugs. 
 
Figure 17. Debugging of the wallet function in Coq 
 Clearly, users of FEther can flexibly choose the most suitable method for verifying their programs. 
5.2 Feature Comparison Overview 
 FEther is the first hybrid symbolic execution engine for Ethereum smart contracts. To illustrate the advantages of FEther over 
the solvers of other tools, we require a compelling benchmark, such as a testing suite or analysis time. Given that FEther is 
constructed on Coq, however, and directly executes and verifies the Solidity source code of smart contracts rather than compiling 
Solidity at the bytecode level, such a benchmark is difficult to find. For a fair comparison, we instead compared the presence and 
absence of various features in FEther and in other tools. The compared features are listed and defined below: 
• Spec.: Suitable as a formal specification of the EVM language 
• Exec.: Executable on concrete tests 
• Certif.: Certifiable self-correctness 
• Verif.: Verifiable properties of EVM programs 
• Debug.: Provision of an interactive EVM debugger 
• Gas.: Tools for analyzing the gas complexity of an EVM program 
• Level.: Analysis or verification level of code 
• Logic.: Type of essential logic supported 
• Hybrid.: Support for hybrid verification methods 
 
Tool Spec. Exec. Certif. Verif. Debug. Gas. Level Logic. Hybrid. 
Yellow Paper Yes No No No No No None None No 
Lem spec Yes Yes Testing Yes No No Byte Code Higher order No 
Mythril Yes Yes Testing Yes Yes Yes Byte Code First order No 
Hsevm No Yes Testing No Yes No Byte Code None No 
Scilla Yes No Testing Yes No No Intermediate Higher order No 
Cpp-ethereum No Yes Testing No No No Byte Code None No 
KEVM Yes Yes Testing Yes Yes Yes Byte Code First order No 
FEther Yes Yes Verifying Yes Yes Yes Solidity Higher order Yes 
Table 8. Feature comparison of FEther semantics and existing software quality tools 
 
 Table 8 overviews the results of the feature comparison. Obviously, only FEther, the core of KEVM, and Mythril support the 
Spec, Exec, Verif, Debug, and Gas features. The Certif feature of FEther is “verifying” rather than “testing,” which improves the 
reliability of FEther (at least in theory) over testing methods such as KEVM and Mythril. Moreover, the execution and verification 
level of FEther is “Solidity” rather than “byte code,” which avoids the error risk during compiling. FEther also supports 
higher-order logic, which improves the expressive ability. Moreover, the fundamental verification theory of FEther is the calculus 
of inductive construction instead of the satisfiability modulo theories or Boolean satisfiability problem. Therefore, the situations 
that cannot be evaluated and verified do not exist. Finally, FEther is the only tool that supports hybrid formal verification. 
 According to our previous experimental results [25], the symbolic execution time of the optimized current version of FEther 
is approximately 0.03 s per statement when the initial arguments are specified, and approximately 0.07 s when the initial 
arguments are inductively defined by quantifiers. The execution efficiency of FEther far exceeded that of the interpreters that are 
developed in Coq in accordance with the standard tutorial developed in Coq. The current version also supports the verification of 
smart contract models adhering to the Ethereum ERC20 standard. 
6. Discussion 
A. Contributions 
 This article overcomes the final challenge noted in our previous work: completing the proof engine of FSPVM-E. We now 
highlight the significant contributions of the present work. First, we confirmed that FEther maintains consistency between the 
Solidity source code and the respective formal specifications. To our knowledge, FEther is the first proof engine of Ethereum that 
supports the hybrid verification technology of Coq. Second, it provides a debug mechanism by which programmers can directly 
debug target smart contracts in Coq. Third, the correctness of FEther has been completely certified in Coq, implying that FEther is 
a reliable proof engine. Fourth, we provided a proprietary set of automatic tactics for FEther, which will help programmers to 
finish their property verifications with a high degree of automation. Finally, we optimized the high-level evaluation efficiency of 
FEther. We confirmed the utility of our previous works in building a certified executable proof engine in Coq. 
 
B. Extensibility and Universality 
Obviously, the definitional interpreter of an intermediate must faithfully capture the intended behaviors of programs written 
in real-world programing languages. From a flexibility perspective, the same interpreter should also be applicable to multiple 
programing languages. Therefore, extensibility and universality were considered in the FEther design from the beginning of its 
development. 
 As mentioned in [14], we deliberately incorporated extensible space in Lolisa. This space is sufficient for expanding features 
such as pointer formalization and for implementing independent operator definitions. It can easily incorporate the features of 
mainstream programing languages by adding new typing rule constructors in the formal abstract syntax and the respective formal 
semantics. Moreover, the formal syntax of Lolisa is simplified by encapsulating it in syntax sugar notations 𝒩. As shown in 
Rules 22 and 23, Lolisa is treated as the core formal language, which is transparent to real-world users. The formal syntax and 
semantics of Lolisa are logically classified into a general component 𝒢 and n special components 𝒮𝑖 (see Rule 22 below).  A 
general-purpose programming language ℒ𝑖 can be formalized identically to the Lolisa subset 𝒢 ∪ 𝒮𝑖, where ℒ𝑖 is symbolically 
represented by the syntax sugar notation 𝒩𝑖 . Here, the syntax symbols are nearly identical to the original syntax symbols of ℒ𝑖. 
This method assigns each ℒ𝑖 with a respective notation set 𝒩𝑖  that satisfies 𝒩𝑖 ⊆ 𝐿𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎. This relation, defined by Rule 23 
below, also improves the extendibility of Lolisa. 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎 ≝ 𝒢 ∪ (⋃ 𝒮𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 ), (22) 
∀𝑖 ∈ ℕ. ℒ𝑖 ↔ 𝒩𝑖 ≡ 𝒢 ∪ 𝒮𝑖 . (23) 
 
 As the respective definitional interpreter of Lolisa, FEther inherits the extensibility advantages of Lolisa, and supports all of 
its syntaxes and semantics. Moreover, at the same level, any executable semantic 𝓈𝑖 is independent of any other semantic, and all 
same-level semantics are encapsulated into an independent module ℳ (see Rules 24 and 25 below). Higher-level semantics can 
access the APIs of lower-level semantics in different ℳs, but the implementation details are transparent among the levels. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 18, FEther is also easily extendible to new executable semantics in Lolisa without affecting the old 
semantics.  
ℳ𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝐾[∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 𝓈𝑖⋂𝓈𝑗 = ∅], (24) 
𝓈ℎ𝑚 ≔ℳ𝑎. (𝐼𝑖]𝓈𝑖]) ℳ𝑏 . (𝐼𝑗]𝓈𝑗])… ℳ𝑞 . (𝐼𝑛]𝓈𝑛]). (25) 
 
Figure 18. Detailed architecture for extending Lolisa to other general-purpose programing languages. 
 
C. Limitations 
 Although the novel features in the current version of FEther confer many advantages, some limitations remain. 
 First, the FEther operates at the Solidity source-code level. Although it will not import vulnerabilities in the compiling 
process, it cannot guarantee the correctness of the bytecode when the compiler is untrusted. One possible solution is developing a 
low-level version of FEther that executes the bytecode generated by the compilation. One must then prove equivalence between 
the Solidity execution results and the respective execution results of the bytecode. 
 Second, similar to other symbolic execution tools, the FEther traverses all possible execution paths, which risks the path 
explosion problem. Given that Ethereum smart contracts are lightweight or even featherweight programs, however, the path 
explosion problem is almost precluded. Moreover, in situations that do meet the path explosion problem, the executions can be 
merged as invariants by the theorem-proving technology, and proven manually. This solution would exploit the selective symbolic 
execution pattern of FEther. 
 Finally, although the current version of FEther achieves property verifications by a few simple automatic tactics, it is not yet 
fully automated. In occasional situations, programmers must analyze the current proof goal and choose suitable verification tactics. 
Fortunately, this goal can be achieved by optimizing the design of the tactic evaluation strategies. 
7. Conclusions and future work 
 This paper tackled the final challenge of the FSPVM blueprint: developing a definitional interpreter in Coq. The interpreter, 
called FEther, supports hybrid symbolic executions of Ethereum smart-contract formal verifications. Based on the GERM memory 
model, FEther accurately simulates the execution behaviors of Solidity in Coq. For evaluating complete situations during the 
FEther execution process, we also designed a set of tactics based on the Ltac mechanism of Coq, and combined them into a huge 
automatic tactic. With this tactic, the FEther can semi-automatically execute and verify different smart contracts in a symbolic 
virtual machine. To demonstrate the power of FEther in the real world, a sample smart contract was verified by conventional 
symbolic executions in FEther (simultaneous concolic and selective symbolic executions). We also compared the essential 
features of FEther and the cores of relevant tools. The self-correctness of FEther had been already confirmed by certifying the 
main functions in Coq. The current version of FEther supports the verification of smart contracts following the ERC20 standard. 
Finally, we discussed the extensibility and universality of FEther, and proposed an initial scheme for systematically simplifying 
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and extending it, thus supporting the formalization of multiple general-purpose programming languages. 
 We hope that FSPVM-E will become sufficiently powerful and user-friendly for easy program verification by general 
programmers. Currently we are formalizing higher-level smart-contract development languages of the EOS blockchain platform 
[29]. We are also aiming to extend and optimize the current version of FEther. Future versions will support the assembly language 
of Solidity. Next, we will extend the FSPVM-E to support the Ethereum and EOS simultaneously. A formal verified interpreter of 
these languages will be developed based on the GERM platform. We will then build a general formal verification toolchain for 
blockchain smart contracts based on the EVI. Finally, we will build a general formal verification toolchain for blockchain smart 
contracts based on EVI, with the ultimate goal of automatic smart-contract verification. 
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Appendix A 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∷ (∀ 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ≔  𝜆 ( 𝑣𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑛) ∶ (∀ 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡)). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡(𝑛, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟) 
Table A.1 Semantics of constant Lolisa values 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 ∷ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 → 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 ≔ 
  𝜆 (𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒). 𝜆 (𝑛𝑎 𝑒 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐) .  
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ⟼ (𝜆 (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) . 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟)) 
      𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |} . (𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜏, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣)) 
Table A.2 Semantics of array types at the value layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑚𝑎  𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∷ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎 → 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑚𝑎 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑇 𝑎𝑝) → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑚𝑎  𝑖𝑛𝑔 ≔ 
  𝜆 (𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒) . 𝜆 (𝜏𝑚𝑎 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑎 ) . 𝜆 (𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑚𝑎 ) . 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐) .  
  𝜆 (𝑉 𝑎𝑝(𝑛𝑎 𝑒 [𝑖𝑑] (𝜏𝑚𝑎 ⇒ 𝜏) 𝑠𝑛𝑑) ∶ 𝑣𝑎𝑙 (𝑇 𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑡 𝑡)). 
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ⟼ 
      (𝜆 (𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) . 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟))  𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 
      𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |} . (𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎 (𝑖𝑑, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝜏, 𝜏𝑚𝑎 , 𝑠𝑛𝑑)) 
Table A.3 Semantics of mapping values 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑟 ∷ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑟 ≔ 
   𝜆 (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑣 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
    𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑣) 
Table A.4 Semantics of struct at the value layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ∷ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 ≔ 
   𝜆 ( 𝑒𝑎𝑑 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 ( 𝑒 𝑠 ∶ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒). 𝜆 (𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠 ∶ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒  (𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡𝑦 𝑒) ⟼ 
      {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 (𝐷𝑎𝑑, 𝑣) ⟼  
        {| 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑑 ⟼  𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑑𝑎𝑑(𝐷𝑎𝑑, 𝑣, 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠) 
         | 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑑 ⟼ 𝑣 |}. 𝐹𝑖𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘( 𝑣) 
       | 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}.  𝑒 𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑(𝜎, 𝑒 𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑡𝑦 𝑒) 
     | 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ,  𝑒𝑎𝑑) 
Table A.5 Semantics of field access at the value layer 
  
  
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 ∷ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 → 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 ≔ 𝜆 (𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒) . 𝜆 (𝑛𝑎 𝑒 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ) . 𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ(𝜏, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣) 
Table A.6 Semantics of left array values at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑝 ∷ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑚𝑎 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑝 ≔ 𝜆 (𝑖𝑑 ∶ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑚𝑎 ) . 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 
(𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎 (𝑖𝑑, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝜏, 𝜏𝑚𝑎 , 𝑠𝑛𝑑)) 
Table A.7. Semantics of field access at the value layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡 ∷ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏) → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡 ≔ 𝜆 ( 𝑣 ∶ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏)). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ) 
  {|  𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎 (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥, 𝜏, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒) ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝜏, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣) 
    𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑉 𝑎𝑝(𝑛𝑎 𝑒 [𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎 ] (𝜏𝑚𝑎 ⇒ 𝜏) 𝑠𝑛𝑑) ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑝(𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑎 , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝜏, 𝜏𝑚𝑎 , 𝑠𝑛𝑑) 
    𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 
  |}. 𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑣) 
Table A.8 Semantics of left constant values at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟
𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟′
∷ (∀ 𝑎 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∶ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(𝑎) 𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(𝑎)) → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟
𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟′
≔ 𝜆 (𝐸𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧) ∶ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧) 𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟(⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧)) . ⟦𝑛𝑎 𝑒⟧ 
Table A.9 Semantics of reference expressions Evar, Efun, Econ, and Epar at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡 ∷ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏) → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑐𝑜 𝑠𝑡 ≔ 𝜆(𝑣 ∶ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝜏)). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐). 
    ℰ𝒮𝑉𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑒(𝐾, 𝑣, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟) 
Table A.10 Semantics of right constant values at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑟 ∷ (∀ 𝑎 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑟  𝑎) → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑟 ≔ 
  𝜆 (𝐾 ∶ ℤ). 𝜆 ( 𝑒𝑎𝑑 {𝑣0; 𝑣1; … ; 𝑣𝑛} ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑟  𝑒𝑎𝑑). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐) 
     𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑟(𝐾,  𝑒𝑎𝑑 {𝑣0; 𝑣1; … ; 𝑣𝑛}, 𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟) 
Table A.11 Semantics of right struct values at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∷ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ≔ 𝜆 (𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ) .  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ⟼  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟) 
    𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |} . 𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 
Table A.12 Semantics of right reference values at the expression layer 
  
 ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑝 ∷ ∀(𝜏 𝜏
 𝜏1 𝜏2 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒), 𝑏𝑜𝑝𝜏  𝜏 → 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝜏 → 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏′ 𝜏 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑝 ≡ 
  ∀(𝜏 𝜏 𝜏1 𝜏2 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒), 𝜆 (𝑜𝑝2 ∶ 𝑏𝑜𝑝𝜏  𝜏 ). 𝜆 (𝑒0 ∶ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝜏 ). 𝜆 (𝑒1 ∶ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏′ 𝜏 ). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 
    𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑜 (𝜎, 𝑜𝑝2, ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝑛, 𝑒0, 𝜎, 𝑏𝑙𝑐, 𝑒𝑛𝑣), ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝑛, 𝑒1, 𝜎, 𝑏𝑙𝑐, 𝑒𝑛𝑣)) 
Table A.13 Semantics of right binary operations at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑢𝑜𝑝 ∷ ∀(𝜏0 𝜏1 𝜏2: 𝑡 𝑝𝑒), 𝑢𝑜𝑝𝜏  𝜏 → 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
ℰ𝒮𝑟𝑒  𝑟𝑢𝑜𝑝 ≔ 
  𝜆 (𝜏0 𝜏1 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒). 𝜆 (𝑜𝑝1 ∶ 𝑢𝑜𝑝𝜏  𝜏 ). 𝜆 (𝑒 ∶ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 ). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ).  
    𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑜 (𝜎, 𝑜𝑝1, ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝑛, 𝑒, 𝜎, 𝑏𝑙𝑐, 𝑒𝑛𝑣)) 
Table A.14 Semantics of right unary operations at the expression layer 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛 ∷ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐
→ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑛  ≔ 𝜆 (𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑒 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠)) . 𝜆 (𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠, 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐 ∶ 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 
  𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ⟼ 
      {|  𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 _ ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 ((𝜎, 𝑎, 𝐶𝑖𝑑 ((𝑐𝑖𝑑 𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟), 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟))) 
        𝑟𝑖𝑔 𝑡 _  ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎 |}. (𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠, 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑐)) 
      𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑒 
Table A.15 Semantics of contract declarations 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑣𝑎𝑟 ∷ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑡 𝑝𝑒 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑣𝑎𝑟  ≔ 𝜆 (𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑒 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒). 𝜆 (𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑐 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 
          𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 ⟼ 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑐, 𝜏, 𝑛𝑎 𝑒) 
    𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  
  |}. 𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑒 
Table A.16 Semantics of variable declarations 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟 ∷ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑟  ≔ 𝜆 (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 ( 𝑒 𝑠𝜏 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑚). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟 (𝜎, 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏 , 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑒(𝑠𝑡𝑟𝜏 ,  𝑒 𝑠𝜏 , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟)) 
Table A.17 Semantics of struct declarations 
  
 ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∷ ℤ → 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙  ≔ 𝜆 (𝑝𝑢 𝑝 ∶ ℤ). 𝜆 (𝑛𝑎 𝑒 ∶ 𝐿𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)). 𝜆 (𝑠 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 
         𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑣⟼ 
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑡 ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝑆 (𝑝𝑢 𝑝, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑣 (𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ((𝐸𝑓𝑢𝑛(𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑒)), 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠)) , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, (𝑠𝑡𝑡 + + 𝑠)) 
      𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒  
    |}. 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑡( 𝑣)  𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑟(𝜎
 , 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠) 
    𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒  
  |}. 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝛼) 
Table A.18 Semantics of function call statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙) → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 
        → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓𝑜𝑟 ≔ 𝜆 (𝐾 ∶ ℤ). 𝜆 (𝑒 ∶ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)). 𝜆 (𝑠0 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦  𝑠1 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝑠𝑛𝑒 𝑡 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 
        𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑏 ⟼ 
    {| 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ⟼ 
      {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎′ ⟼ 
        {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎′′ ⟼ 
          {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎′′′ ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑟(𝑒, 𝑠0, 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 , 𝑠1) ∷ 𝑠𝑛𝑒 𝑡) 
          𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠1) 
        𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦) 
      𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠0) 
    𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝑠𝑛𝑒 𝑡) |}. 𝑏 
  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 (ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝐾, 𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎)) 
Table A.19 Semantics of for loop statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙) → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 
         → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 ≔ 𝜆(𝑒 ∶ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)). 𝜆 (𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝑠𝑛𝑒 𝑡 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡).  
          𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠 ∶ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑏 ⟼ 
    {| 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ⟼ 
      {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎′ ⟼  ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝑒, 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦) ∷ 𝑠𝑛𝑒 𝑡 , 𝜎′) 
      𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦) 
    𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝑆(𝑠𝑛𝑒 𝑡) |}. 𝑏 
  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 (ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝐾, 𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎)) 
Table 20. Semantics of while loop statements 
  
 ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓 ∷ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓 ≔ 𝜆 (𝑠 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟(𝐸𝑓𝑢𝑛(𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙, (𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎)), [𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟0, 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟1, … , 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛], 𝛬𝑓 𝑛 , 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦) ⟼ 
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎′ ⟼  
      {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎  ⟼𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎
  , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦)  
        𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒(𝜎
 , 𝛬𝑓 𝑛 , [𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙]) 
      𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 (𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑐, 𝜏, 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖), [𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟0, 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟1, … , 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛]) 
    𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑓 𝑛(𝑠) 
Table A.21 Semantics of modifier statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓 𝑛 ∷ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓 𝑛 ≔ 𝜆 (𝑠 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 [𝜎0, 𝜎1, … , 𝜎𝑛] ⟼ 
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ⟼ 
      {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟(𝐸𝑓𝑢𝑛([𝜏0, 𝜏1, … , 𝜏𝑛], (𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑎)), [𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟0, 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟1, … , 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛], 𝛬𝑓 𝑛 , 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦) ⟼ 
        {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎′ ⟼  
          {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎  ⟼𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎
  , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑛𝑎 𝑒, 𝑠𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦)  
            𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑒(𝜎
 , 𝛬𝑓 𝑛 , [𝜏0, 𝜏1 , … , 𝜏𝑛]) 
          𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 (𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑜𝑎𝑐𝑐, 𝜏, 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖), [𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟0, 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟1, … , 𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛]) 
        𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑓 𝑛(𝑠) 
      𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ⟼ 𝜎 
      𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘([𝜎0, 𝜎1, … , 𝜎𝑛], 𝜎𝑚𝑡𝑟 𝑒 , 𝜎) 
   𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 ⟼ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 |}. 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡 (ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙(𝜎, 𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑖), [ 𝑜𝑑𝑖0,  𝑜𝑑𝑖1, … , 𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛]) 
Table A.22 Semantics of function statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑖𝑓 ∷ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙) → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑖𝑓 ≔ 𝜆(𝑒 ∶ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)). 𝜆 (𝑠0 𝑠1 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑏 ⟼ 
    {| 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑠0 
      𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ⟼ 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑠1 |}. 𝑏 
    𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙 (ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝐾, 𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎)) 
Table A.23 Semantics of conditional statements 
  
 ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ∷ ℤ → (∀ 𝜏0, 𝜏1 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 ) → (∀ 𝜏0, 𝜏1 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 ) → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ≔ 𝜆 (𝐾 ∶ ℤ). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑟 ∶ (∀ 𝜏 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏 𝑇𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑙)). 𝜆 (𝑠0 𝑠1 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑣 ⟼ 
    {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑛𝑎 𝑒 ⟼ 
      {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑣 ⟼ 
        {| 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ⟼ ℰ𝒮𝑆 (𝐾, 𝜎, 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ((𝐸𝑓𝑢𝑛(𝑜𝛼)), 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠)) 
        𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ⟼ 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎
 , 𝑒𝑛𝑣 , 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑣
 )  
      |}. 𝑐 𝑒𝑐 𝑣(𝐹𝑖𝑑, 𝑣) 
    𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  
    |}. ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑙𝑒  𝑟(𝐾, 𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎) 
  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  
  |}. ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝐾, 𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎) 
Table A.24 Semantics of assignment statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑟𝑒 ∷ (∀ 𝜏0 𝜏1 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 ) →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑟𝑒  ≔ 𝜆 (∀ 𝜏0 𝜏1 ∶ 𝑡 𝑝𝑒, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝜏  𝜏 ). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐).  
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑣 ⟼  𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , Λ𝑓 𝑛 , 𝑣) 
    𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. ℰ𝒮𝐸𝑟𝑒  𝑟(𝐾, 𝑒, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎) 
Table A.25 Semantics of return statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∷ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑠 →  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐸𝑛𝑣 → 𝐵𝑙𝑐 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠  ≔ 𝜆 (𝑒𝑠 ∶ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑠). 𝜆 (𝑒𝑛𝑣 ∶ 𝐸𝑛𝑣). 𝜆 (𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∶ 𝐵𝑙𝑐). 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ) 
  {| 𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑣𝑠 ⟼  𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑘(𝜎, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , Λ𝑓 𝑛 , 𝑣𝑠) 
    𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ⟼ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 |}. 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒  𝑟𝑠(𝐾, 𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝜎) 
Table A.26 Semantics of multiple return statements 
 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑙 ∷  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟   
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑠𝑛𝑖𝑙 ≔ 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). (𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎) 
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤 ∷  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟   
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤  ≔ 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). (𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑟(𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 , 𝑒𝑛𝑣, 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟 , _0𝑥𝑡 𝑟𝑜𝑤, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒))  
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓 𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜 ∷  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 → 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒 𝑜𝑟   
ℰ𝒮𝑆𝑓 𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜  ≔ 𝜆 (𝜎 ∶  𝑒 𝑜𝑟 ). (𝑆𝑜 𝑒 𝜎)  
Table A.27 Semantics of skip, throw and function stop statements 
  
Appendix B 
Algorithm B.1. Source code of the wallet function 
 
 
